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2Summary1
Adaptation does not necessarily lead to traits which are optimal for the population. This is2
because selection is often strongest at the individual or gene level. The evolution of3
selfishness can lead to a ‘tragedy of the commons’, where traits such as aggression or social4
cheating reduce population size and may lead to extinction. This suggests that species-level5
selection will result whenever species differ in the incentive to be selfish. We explore this6
idea in a simple model that combines individual-level selection with ecology in two7
interacting species. Our model is not influenced by kin or trait-group selection. We find that8
individual selection in combination with competitive exclusion greatly increases the9
likelihood that selfish species go extinct. A simple example of this would be a vertebrate10
species that invests heavily into squabbles over breeding sites, which is then excluded by a11
species that invests more into direct reproduction. A multi-species simulation shows that these12
extinctions result in communities containing species that are much less selfish. Our results13
suggest that species-level selection and community dynamics play an important role in14
regulating the intensity of conflicts in natural populations.15
Key-words: Levels of selection, interspecific competition, selfishness, conflict16
3“Animals and plants are not quite such ruthlessly efficient strugglers as they would be if Darwinism were the1
whole truth… it does not pay a species to be too well adapted. A variation making for too great efficiency may2
cause a species to destroy its food and starve itself to death. This very important principle may explain a good3
deal of the diversity in nature, and the fact that most species have some characters which cannot be accounted4
for on orthodox Darwinian lines”. J.B.S. Haldane (Haldane, 1939)5
Introduction6
Ever since the group selection debate in the 1960s, it has been clear that selection acting at the7
level of the gene or the individual does not necessarily produce adaptations that are optimal8
for the population (Dawkins, 1976, Williams, 1966). Indeed, individual-interested behaviour9
can often be expected to cause resource depletion resulting in a the ‘tragedy of the commons’10
(Hardin, 1968), which in its most extreme form may cause population demise, or11
‘evolutionary suicide’ (Dieckmann & Ferrière, 2004, Parvinen, 2005).12
The concept of the tragedy of the commons has most often been evoked when studying the13
overexploitation of resources by humans (Hardin, 1998, Ostrom, 1999, Penn, 2003), where it14
is argued that short-sighted selfish behaviour will invariably lead to disaster for the15
individuals using that resource. However, it also applies to non-humans where selection for16
selfish competition is expected to be widespread (Frank, 1995, Leigh, 1977, Falster &17
Westoby, 2003, Foster, 2004, Rankin & Kokko, 2006, Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004). Moral18
restraint is often invoked as an argument for resolving the tragedy in humans (Hardin, 1968),19
and policing (Frank, 1995, Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006b) or sufficient relatedness (Frank,20
1995, Foster, 2004, Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004) can limit the tragedy in other species.21
However, the evolution of policing is only possible in some contexts (such as insect societies22
– e.g. Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006b), and not all species exist in kin-structured communities.23
This begs the question of whether evolutionary suicide commonly occurs in nature (Rankin &24
4López-Sepulcre, 2005), and whether such extinctions can act as an important higher level of1
selection (Foster, 2006).2
An increasing number of empirical and theoretical studies show how individual selection has3
the potential to harm the population (e.g. Muir & Howard, 1999, Fiegna & Velicer, 2003). For4
example, territorial animals risk injury, as well as waste time and energy that could be better5
invested in reproduction and survival, in contests over space. Succeeding in this competition6
is essential for individual reproduction but the predicted patterns of space division reduce the7
number of individuals that can exist on any given area (López-Sepulcre & Kokko, 2005).8
Conflicts can therefore result in a lowering of population density (López-Sepulcre & Kokko,9
2005). Figure 1 shows examples where wasteful within-species conflict may affect species10
persistence.11
While a reduction in population density is not equivalent to extinction, it is likely to increase12
the extinction risk (Soulé, 1987, Leigh, 1981, Lande, 1993). Species extinctions, for example,13
have long been considered to be important in the evolution of sex, due to the higher extinction14
risk of asexuals (Fisher, 1930, Nunney, 1989, van Valen, 1975), and extinctions are also15
thought to be important in the evolution of cancer (Nunney, 1999). Despite a rich history on16
the relative importance of species-level selection as an adaptive force (Gould & Lloyd, 1999,17
Lloyd & Gould, 1993, Vrba, 1984), the population consequences of adaptive behaviour have18
been argued to act as a relatively weak selective pressure at the level of the species (e.g.19
Maynard Smith, 1964). However, in a community context, traits are expected to affect species20
persistence when they alter the likelihood of competitive exclusion by other members of the21
community (Hardin, 1960, Ciros-Pérez et al., 2002), even if they do not cause evolutionary22
suicide by themselves.23
5Here we explore the effects of extinctions at the species-level on the evolution of conflict in1
multi-species communities. We specifically look at the joint effect of individual-level2
selection, where selection acts on individuals, and species-level selection, where species go3
extinct due to behavioural adaptation at the individual level. There is no spatial deme structure4
or trait-group selection (sensu Wilson, 1975) in the model. First, we incorporate selfish5
evolution into a simple two-species Lotka-Volterra competition model to illustrate the extent6
to which competitive exclusion may influence the population density of selfish species.7
Second, we use a simulation to investigate macroevolutionary effects, both in an isolated8
species and in a community setting. In particular, we ask the question that, given selfish9
competition within a species may harm populations, what part do community interactions10
play in the macroevolutionary consequences of such harm?11
6The models1
1. TWO-SPECIES DYNAMICS AND THE EVOLUTION OF SELFISHNESS2
Our goal is to evaluate the impact of a selfish and competitive trait zi on population3
persistence and the resulting species-level selection. In this section, we describe a simple4
analytical model of two species, where species 1 suffers from wasteful and selfish within-5
species competition. The logic of the model is to calculate the evolved level of selfishness in6
species 1 (e.g. fighting), and then see how this affects its population density. By putting the7
effects of wasteful competition into the ecological context, we are able to evaluate how8
wastefulness within a species affects between-species competition, and ultimately, species9
persistence. We begin, however, by defining the two key terms in the models.10
Selfishness: Competitive  ‘selfishness’ zi  is the degree to which individuals of species i11
compete in a way that lowers the reproductive performance of the population, where 0 ? z ?12
1. Our use of ‘selfishness’ throughout the paper, therefore, refers to the strength of13
intraspecific conflict. A simple example is fighting over a breeding site where an individual14
allocating all of its energy into such fights would have a z of 1, while a non-fighting15
individual would have a value of z=0. Investing energy in fighting decreases the resources16
available for reproduction, and is expected to therefore decrease population density (López-17
Sepulcre & Kokko, 2005). Other potential examples include investment in slime production18
by bacteria that suffocates members of the same species but lowers overall growth rate19
(Xavier & Foster, 2007), or social insect larvae that become new queens rather than workers20
in colonies that already have a queen (Ratnieks et al., 2006, Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004).21
Figure 1 shows some example systems where wasteful selfishness may affect species22
persistence.23
7Competitive Incentive: The evolution of traits like fighting will depend not only on the1
demography and the environment, but also on the constraints and life history characteristics of2
the species in question. Because species differ in their constraints, the incentive to invest in3
selfish competition with other members of their species will also differ between species. For4
example, predator avoidance might constrain a bird’s ability to fight, and in insect colonies5
with a discrete reproductive phase and no queen succession, there is no benefit to selfishly6
becoming a new queen apart from during a short period each year (e.g. vespine wasps, Foster7
& Ratnieks, 2001). We investigate how this incentive ai affects the level of conflict, and8
higher levels of selection. The value of ai can change, according to the extent to which this9
incentive covaries with population density (e.g. territorial aggression may be10
counterproductive if vacant breeding habitat is readily available, Kokko et al., 2006), such11
that ai is the maximum incentive of individuals in species i to invest in selfishness in the12
absence of any influence of density on the behaviour.13
14
Individual-level selection15
We start by considering selection for selfish behaviour within species 1 by calculating the16
invasion fitness of a mutant zi’ invading a population of residents. The fitness of a mutant,17
z1’is then18
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1, ,w z z f z z R z¢ ¢= (1)19
Where R1( 1z ) defines the group performance of species 1 (per capita growth rate), which is a20
function of selfishness in species 1 but is also affected by resource competition from species 221
(see equation 2, below). The benefit gained from a mutant individual investing z1’ in22
competition in a population comprising individuals which invest 1z  in selfishness is described23
8by the function ( )1 1,f z z¢ . Following the logic of Frank (1995) and Foster (2004), we use1
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1, / 1f z z z z cza¢ ¢ ¢= - , where ? scales the incentive to invest in selfish competition.2
For ? = 1 and c = 0, the model becomes identical to Frank (1995), where selfishness leads to3
population collapse (a tragedy of the commons). However, for c > 0, the expression includes4
an individual cost of expressing the selfish traits, which puts an upper bound on the individual5
investment into competition (e.g. intense fighting is personally costly, Foster, 2004,6
Hammerstein & Reichert, 1988). A mutant with a phenotype of z’ will be able to invade a7
population containing z individuals if ( ) ( )1 1 1 1, , 0w z z w z z¢ - > , allowing us to calculate the8
direction of evolution (lower or higher z favoured) in z1.9
10
Two-species interactions11
We now consider the impact of selfishness z in species 1 on the population dynamics and12
competition with species 2. In our example, we assume that species 2 does not exhibit selfish13
behaviour (e.g. does not fight with conspecifics), and therefore has a value of z fixed at zero.14
This allows us to look at the population consequences of the evolution of selfishness of15
species 1 (eq. 1), when undergoing interspecific competition. The two species compete over a16
common resource E, where Ei(x) is the maximum availability of resource x that an individual17
of species i could use. Critically, the ability of species 1 to translate the shared resource into18
reproduction decreases with increased selfishness z (equation 2 below). x denotes a resource19
gradient that may be interpreted in different ways, for example habitat with a specific20
microclimate (Ei(x) then gives the area of such habitat available to individuals of species i), or21
food items of a specific size (Ei(x) is then the available density of such items). To provide an22
illustrative example, the amount of resources available to each species is defined by two23
9simple functions: ( ) ( )1 1E x bExp x= -  and ( ) ( )2E x bExp x= , such that the two species have a1
significant degree of niche overlap but they are not ecologically identical (species 2 is better2
at using large values of x). The overlap makes interspecific competition an important factor3
determining the densities of both species. The population density of species i is given as ni4
and its dynamics can be described by the equation ( ) ( ) ( )1i i in t R z n t+ = , where R indicates5
average per capita population growth:6
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 2 2
i i
i i
E x q z
R z dx
n E x n E x
=
+ò (2)7
The effect of density-dependence from within- and between-species competition is captured8
by the denominator in equation 2: in the absence of species 2, the reproductive rate of species9
1 is simply determined by the number of individuals in the population (i.e. it is density10
dependent). In the presence of conflict with other individuals, the effect of wasteful11
selfishness by members of species i on resource availability is captured by qi(zi), where qi is12
the fraction of the resource that remains useful to individuals of a given species, and13
selfishness (z) has a negative effect on this fraction, such that ¶qi(zi)/¶zi < 0, and q(zi)=(1-zi)?.14
A low value of b means that competition in a species is very wasteful, and therefore15
population-wide reproduction suffers greatly from individual selfishness, making a species16
more likely to go extinct with a small increase in z. A larger value confers the opposite effect.17
Note that q does not appear in the denominator, indicating that resources inefficiently used by18
species 1 are not available to the other species. This assumption makes our model19
conservative because if resources wasted by species 1 could be used by species 2 then this20
would further promote the advantage of the latter. A nice example of this possibility is21
territoriality. If species 1 is highly territorial over space and leaves a lot of resources22
10
unexploited in the environment, this will not only lower its growth rate (López-Sepulcre &1
Kokko, 2005) but also increase the resources available to competing species.2
3
Model results4
Figures 2 and 3 show the zero-growth isoclines of this two species system, along with the5
respective population densities when species 1 has reached evolutionary stability. This6
assumes that populations are always at their ecological equilibria i.e. that ecological processes7
are much faster than evolutionary ones. First we consider the dynamics of species 1 if species8
2 is absent (points along the x axis, Figure 2). Individual-level selection then has a fairly9
minor effect on the population density of species 1 (compare the location of point I in Figure10
2a with Figure 2b). Now consider coexistence if neither species has yet evolved selfishness11
(point II in the left-hand figure); the different but symmetrical use of the resource gradient12
results in coexistence where both species have equal population density.13
When individual-level selection and between-species competition are considered in14
combination, the outcome is dramatically different. Individual level selection for wasteful15
resource use in species 1 reduces its ability to compete with species 2. As a result competitive16
exclusion occurs and species 1 goes extinct (point II in the right-hand figure). For example,17
this could mean that within-species fighting in species 1 reduces the population growth rate so18
much that species 2 can drive it extinct. Or comparably, that within-group competition in a19
slime mould slug limits its migration (Foster et al., 2002) so much that a second conflict-free20
species is able to out-compete it by reaching resources more efficiently.21
Figure 3 shows the isoclines of a case where the competitive incentive is lower, and both22
species can coexist even after species 1 has undergone selection for increased selfishness.23
Even here, the combination of individual-level selection and competition from species 224
11
combines to result in a greatly reduced population density of species 1, which in a stochastic1
world could imply increased vulnerability to extinction (Leigh, 1981, Lande, 1993). This may2
reflect the situation in the yellowjacket wasps where species with high levels of intracolony3
conflict over male production tend to have smaller colonies (Foster & Ratnieks, 2001).4
2. EVOLUTION OF SELFISHNESS IN A MULTI-SPECIES SIMULATION5
Our isocline model is a proof-of-principle that selfishness selected at the individual level can6
have important consequences for the probability that a species will persist. We now use a7
simulation to evaluate its macroevolutionary consequences in communities containing many8
evolving species (our previous example only allowed one species to evolve). Our focus is on9
the competitive incentive (ai), which is the central parameter defining the level of selfishness10
in a focal species. This is a species property or life-history character which drives the benefit11
gained from investing in conflict. Low values of a mean that there is relatively little to be12
gained from investing more in selfishness z, while higher values of a mean the opposite. We13
examine its distribution before and after the simulation in order to ascertain whether species-14
level selection affects the overall selfishness of species. In addition, we compare community15
simulations to the case of a single species (isolated-species simulations) to examine whether16
community interactions amplify any effects of species-level selection.17
The community simulation allows speciation to take place, with daughter species being18
ecologically similar to the immediate ancestor, and species going extinct if they fail to satisfy19
current conditions for ecological coexistence. We continually update the equilibrium20
population density for each evolved level of selfishness, and hence take every species to be at21
its ecological equilibrium density. As such, we assume a separation of ecological and22
evolutionary time-scales such that individual-level selection takes place at a much slower rate23
than the population dynamics (see appendix). The ecological and evolutionary dynamics24
12
generate extinction events intermittently across the simulation whenever selfishness evolves1
to levels which result in population densities below a certain extinction threshold, ?. Full2
details of the simulation are provided in the appendix.3
Model results4
Figure 4 shows the initial distribution of the incentive for selfishness, and the distributions of5
the trait in the surviving species at the end of the simulation for both the isolated simulation6
and the community simulation. Analysing the results of all simulations reveals that species-7
level selection has a strong effect on the distribution of species properties: the starting8
distribution differed significantly with the distribution after individual-level selection in an9
isolated species (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p<0.0001 both when ? = 2 and ? = 5). Taking10
interactions with other species into account in the community simulation revealed that11
community ecology greatly intensified species-level selection: the distribution of surviving12
species in the community simulation differed significantly from both the original distribution13
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov p<0.0001 both when ? = 2 and ? = 5) and from the surviving species14
in the single-species simulation (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p<0.0001 both when ? = 2 and ? = 5).15
This is well illustrated by the medians of the incentive a , which were roughly halved from16
their initial values in the single species simulation, and halved again in the community17
simulation (figure 4). Means of distributions undergo changes of similar magnitude (not18
shown).19
We checked the robustness of our results against several alternative assumptions. The results20
of our model were qualitatively the same (i.e. shifts of distributions show similar patterns) if21
density-dependence of the incentive (see appendix) was removed. Likewise, the results22
remained qualitatively similar when (1) the daughter species had a low population size (set at23
a value slightly larger than the extinction threshold), as opposed to parent and daughter24
13
species both taking half of the original population density, (2) for longer simulation times1
(10,000 versus 3000 generations) were used and (3) for variation in the initial distribution of2
a.3
4
5. Discussion5
There is a strong feeling in the evolutionary literature that adaptations should be primarily6
viewed as a result of selection acting at the level of the individual (or further below, at the7
gene, e.g. Keller, 1999, Burt & Trivers, 2006). It is a telling example that Haldane was8
ridiculed for our opening quotation by Cronin (1993), who suggested that he was playing to9
socialist ideology “rather than attempting to propagate a genuine Darwinian unorthodoxy”.10
Our model supports Haldane’s (1939) argument. We know that the individual-level selection11
point of view can explain why species can be so short-sighted that they become extinct12
(Matsuda & Abrams, 1994a, Gyllenberg & Parvinen, 2001, Rankin & López-Sepulcre, 2005).13
Our model shows that this very shortsightedness necessarily creates conditions in which14
higher levels of selection become important, and this applies particularly strongly in a15
community context. We did not allow for kin or group selection to occur that might promote16
cooperation, yet species with more cooperative habits (lower z) prevailed. If ‘selfishness’17
ultimately leads to population extinction, species in which individuals have a high incentive to18
behave selfishly will eventually be removed. This will consequently affect the properties of19
species that we see in nature.20
A central finding from our model is that it is not required that species commit true21
evolutionary suicide for species-level selection to work. Selfishness need only weaken a22
species, such that it more easily falls victim to competitive exclusion (figure 2). This shows23
that Hardin’s competitive exclusion principle (Hardin, 1960) can function to make the effects24
14
of his tragedy (Hardin, 1968) more severe. Competitive exclusion is a common finding in1
ecological communities, which suggests that these processes have important consequences for2
real communities. This is consistent with work on sexual and asexual populations of rotifers3
(Ciros-Pérez et al., 2002). In single-species populations, costs associated with sex had no4
effect on population density (Ciros-Pérez et al., 2002). However, in multispecies communities5
the increased levels of sexual reproduction resulted in increased risk of competitive exclusion6
and extinction, generating species-level selection against sexuality. Although the study by7
Ciros-Pérez et al. (2002) did not consider selfishness per se, it clearly highlights the potential8
effects of community interactions upon extinctions.9
The evolutionary effects in our model are driven by the fact that species differ in traits10
associated with selfishness (which is reflected in a). There are many ways that this can come11
about, including basic differences in ecology: a species foraging on concentrated patchy12
resources that can be defended might have a higher propensity for competition and selfishness13
than one living on dispersed resources. Although not required, variation in the incentive for14
selfishness will be also affected by factors that promote cooperation, such as the degree to15
which individuals interact with relatives (Figure 1a,c; Hamilton, 1964, Griffin & West, 2003,16
Ratnieks et al., 2006) and enforcement mechanisms (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006a,17
Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006b). Another mechanism, which can be associated with18
enforcement  (Foster et al., 2007), is the degree of pleiotropy where one gene affects multiple19
traits. This phenomenon is both extremely common in all genomes and highly variable in its20
effects (Foster et al., 2004, Foster et al., 2007). When a pleiotropic relationship happens to be21
present in the genome that ties a potential selfish trait to a personal cost, this will reduce the22
incentive for selfishness (a). Our model predicts that this reduced incentive will increase23
species persistence, and, therefore, that such pleiotropic relationships should commonly occur24
in nature. An example can be found in a social amoeba, Dictyostelium discoideum, which25
15
forms social aggregations where some cells die in an apparent act of altruism to form a stalk1
that allows other cells to disperse as spores. Pleiotropy of the gene dimA links this altruistic2
act of stalk production to the ability to make spores, thereby reducing the incentive to be3
selfish and limiting the evolution of cheaters that produce fewer stalk cells (Foster et al.,4
2004).5
An associated assumption of our model is that, given that species differ in the traits associated6
with selfishness, the variation is great enough to be important in species persistence. An7
alternative explanation for the absence of traits that lead to ‘too tragic’ outcomes is that the8
incentives to invest in intraspecific competition are simply never great enough to be an9
important cause of extinctions. In our model this would correspond to values of the incentive10
a that are always constrained to low values that have little effect on species persistence11
compared to other traits or chance events. Evidence against this alternative come from a12
number of studies that suggest that individual selection can drive population demise (Rankin13
& López-Sepulcre, 2005). Analogously to D. discoideum, cells of the social bacterium14
Myxococcus xanthus form complex fruiting structures, where individuals in the fruiting body15
are then released as spores (Fiegna & Velicer, 2003). Artificially selected cheater strains,16
which produce a higher number of spores than wild-types, can invade wild-type strains under17
laboratory conditions. However, although such cheaters do well in competition with the18
wildtype, they can cause population extinction because their strategy compromises fruiting19
body development and they are unable to produce spores alone (Fiegna & Velicer, 2003).20
Further support that conflict can increase the risk of extinction comes from comparative21
studies. For example, the intensity of sperm competition in birds (Morrow & Pitcher, 2003),22
and larger genome size, associated with a higher prevalence of selfish DNA (Vinogradov,23
2003), have been found to be associated with extinction risk.24
16
Several studies, therefore, suggest that species-level selection can be important. Nevertheless,1
it remains a challenge for future research to distinguish between our hypothesis that species-2
level selection drives down selfishness and the alternative that variation in species properties3
(as shown by the effects on a in our model) is rarely important enough to cause extinctions.4
Naturally, both predict that extant species should not exhibit values that do not allow5
persistence. The observation that species introductions to new geographical areas are often6
detrimental and can cause extinctions (Clavero & García-Berthou, 2005) provides a basis to7
test the idea that strong intraspecific conflict predicts failure in novel situations of8
interspecific competition. For example, previous work has predicted that, as species richness9
increases, so does the extinction rate (Weatherby et al., 1998). We predict these extinctions to10
depend not only on the degree of niche overlap, but also on how intense intraspecific conflicts11
are in the species concerned. All else being equal, we predict that extreme forms of12
intraspecific conflict are less likely to be observed in species-rich communities than in those13
with low species richness.14
17
Conclusion1
Despite the plethora of recent work demonstrating that individual-level selection can lead to2
extinction (Matsuda & Abrams, 1994a, Matsuda & Abrams, 1994b, Muir & Howard, 1999,3
Gyllenberg & Parvinen, 2001, Gyllenberg et al., 2002, Dercole et al., 2002, Dieckmann &4
Ferrière, 2004, Howard et al., 2004), the macroevolutionary consequences of such extinctions5
have remained unexplored. Our model demonstrates that such ‘evolutionary suicide’ can have6
strong effects on the distribution of traits in nature. Importantly, we show that species-level7
selection can operate through competitive exclusion whenever selfishness weakens the8
competitive ability of a species, even in the absence of true evolutionary suicide. This9
principle may indeed explain why species “are not quite such ruthlessly efficient strugglers”10
(Haldane, 1939) as they might be.11
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Appendix – Multi-species simulation1
For the simulation, we assume that evolutionary and ecological dynamics occur over separate2
timescales, such that the ecological equilibria (population densities) are approached much3
faster than evolutionary changes occur. The notation of the isocline model is here modified to4
yield an individual performance function ( , )i ij if z a , that is used to calculate the fitness wij for5
individual j of species i, according to its share of the resources available to the whole species:6
( ) ( ),
( , )
,
( , )
i ij i
i j ij i i i
i i i
f z
w z z R z
f z
a
a
= (A1)7
The function R(z) is based on equation (1), and describes the total per capita resource8
available to species i, extended to include the niche use by all members of the community9
(note that the sum includes species i):10
( ) ( )( )
( )
i i
i i
j jx
j
E x q z
R z dx
n E x
= ò å
, (A2)11
The first part of the RHS of equation (A1) defines the share of available resources that focal12
individual gets as a function of its competitiveness, and the second part weights this by the13
overall amount of resources available (from equation 1), which is a function of both intra- and14
interspecific competition. We assume that there is relatively little variation in z at any point in15
time, such that ( , )i i if z a  can be used as a good approximation of the mean of ( , )i ij if z a , taken16
over different values of zij used in the population. We use the function17
( ) ( )( ), = exp /i i i i i i if z z z m na a-  in our examples. This function allows us to consider cases18
where ‘too selfish’ behaviour simply brings about costs (e.g., superfluous aggression) to the19
individual while no longer increasing the benefits gained (Knowlton & Parker, 1979, Foster,20
26
2004). From this function, it follows that
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
,
exp / 1 /i ij i i i i i i i
ij
f z
c z m n z m n
z
a
a a
¶
= - -
¶
,1
and therefore selfish gains from competitive behaviour peak at ( )iii nmz a=  and decline after2
that.3
The incentive to be selfish is likely to be small at lower population densities than at higher4
population densities, which will tend to reduce the potential for selfishness to drive extinction5
(e.g. Rankin, 2007). To use our earlier example of fighting, there will be less incentive to6
compete aggressively for resources when the population density is so low that many resources7
remain undefended (Kokko et al., 2006), which will make the incentive positively density-8
dependent. In order to be conservative, therefore, we include such density dependence in our9
model. The function ( )im n  describes the relationship between the overall incentive and10
population density. We assume that ( )inm  reaches its highest possible value a i when the11
population is very dense, and declines with lowering density; the speed of this decline is12
scaled by the parameterg i, the density-dependence of the incentive. In our examples we use13
the function ( ) ( )( )iii nnm g/exp1 --= . Note that positive density-dependence of the incentive14
is a distinct process from the negative density-dependence that affects population growth15
(which is represented in the function R(z)), which also has to be included in our model in16
order to regulate population sizes.17
The effect of selection on the evolution of selfishness (z)18
To investigate the effect of selection on selfishness z we assume constant heritabilities of z19
across species, and calculate the selection gradient as20
( ),ij ij i
i i
ij
w z z
z
z
d
¶
D =
¶
, (A3)21
27
Here, the factor di is proportional to sAij2/wij where sAij2 is additive genetic variance for z. Our1
assumption that evolutionary change is slow compared to ecological change is reflected in2
low values of di. We can write the change in z over time as ( ) ( )1i i iz t z t z+ = + D , where3
( ) ( ), ( , )
( , )
ij ij i ij ii i
ij i i i ij
w z z f zR z
z f z z
a
a
¶ ¶
=
¶ ¶
 is obtained by evaluating the right-hand side of equation4
A3.5
To follow the evolutionary and ecological dynamics of a species, we define the maximum6
amount of resource available to a given species, ( ) ( )2, ,i iE x v x m s= , where the niche7
distribution ( ), ,i iv x m s  follows a normal distribution evaluated at x, with mean mi and8
variance si2. In other words, species i uses resources that match its niche midpoint, x = mI,9
with the highest efficiency.10
Ecological and evolutionary dynamics11
To link evolution and population dynamics, we assume ‘fast-slow’ dynamics (Matsuda &12
Abrams, 1994a, Dieckmann et al., 1995), such that ecological processes happen considerably13
faster than evolutionary ones. Thus, to derive the ecological equilibria, we may assume fixed14
behaviour { },...,i kz z  of all species. The population dynamics of the ith species15
is ( 1) ( ) ( , )i i i i in t n t R z b+ = . Here we are assuming that the per capita resources Ri determine16
population growth. Due to the low value of di, the population dynamics are assumed to17
change at a faster rate than the evolutionary dynamics. It is important to note that extinctions18
are a result of both ecological and evolutionary processes, so the rate of extinctions is not19
defined a priori but is an emergent property of the simulation.20
Starting values21
28
The functions described above are made species-specific by giving each species different1
properties of competitive incentive (ai). Initial, positive, values of a i were chosen from2
exponential distributions to avoid artificial constrains, while making lower, more realistic,3
values more likely. However, our results remained qualitatively identical if a normal4
distribution was used in place of our exponential distribution (not shown) or if we used5
substantially higher or lower starting values of a i . Each simulation started with niche6
parameters m i =0, s i 2 = 0.01, and an initial low value of z i =0.01. Every time step, the7
dynamics were updated to calculate the population density and current value of z for all8
species in the community. Then the properties of each species were shifted proportionally to9
the selection gradient given by equation A3, which is a discretised approximation of a10
separation in ecological and evolutionary time-scales.11
Speciation and extinctions12
In the community simulations, new species were added by speciation. At each time step, a13
species could speciate with a small probability, pS. We assume a simple ‘point mutation’14
mode of speciation (Hubbell, 2001); the population was split in half, and the daughter species15
mutated to take different values of a, and also of the niche parameters m and s 2. The new16
value of a trait after mutation, u¢ , was calculated with the formula17
( ) ( )( )exp log ,u u M Vy¢ = + , where u is the original value of either the incentive to invest in18
competition or the niche overlap (i.e. a i or s i 2) and ? is a normally distributed random19
number with mean M and variance V (taken to be 0 and 0.1, respectively). A normal20
distribution is required in this case because in this case any individual species may experience21
competition from either side on the niche axis (this is in contrast to the two species model,22
where an exponential was used to allow tractability). This scales properly in our setting,23
ensuring values remain positive. The mean of the niche can take negative values, and24
29
therefore the niche mean (mi) was mutated by adding a normally distributed small random1
number (with mean 0, and variance 0.01) to the original value of m i.2
We ran simulations with no speciation (pS = 0, isolated-species simulation) as well as with a3
speciation rate of pS = 0.05 (community simulation) in order to investigate the influence of4
community structure on species-level selection. Additionally, we ran a considerable number5
of simulations providing sensitivity checks with some of the assumptions altered (i.e. length6
of simulation run, initial distributions of a i, and the details of the speciation process; details7
provided in the results).8
Extinction occurred if the density of a species fell below a certain, small, threshold ?. At each9
time step all species with population densities below this threshold were removed from the10
community. Using such thresholds for extinction make use of the assumption that very low11
population sizes will be driven extinct due to stochastic processes (Matsuda & Abrams,12
1994a, Dieckmann & Ferrière, 2004). We recorded the values of ? for all species which13
survived at the end of the simulation. Unless all species went extinct, the simulation14
proceeded until a set time was reached (3000 time steps in this model). In both the isolated15
species model, and the community model, the complete simulation was repeated until we16
obtained 500 simulations in which at least one species remained at the end. The values of a17
were recorded for all surviving species. The results of each simulation were pooled for18
analysis. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to see if the distribution of a differed19
between the isolated-species and the community simulation, as well as from the original20
exponential distribution.21
22
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Figure and Table Legends1
Figure 1. Examples where wasteful within-species conflict may affect the probability of2
species persistence. a) Worker laying in a small-colony yellow jacket species Dolichovespula3
saxonica. Laying by workers directs resources away from work into male production that4
conflicts with the queen (Ratnieks et al., 2006). b) Skull of the extinct Irish Elk Megaloceros5
giganteus showing the massive antlers. Although far from certain  (Stuart et al., 2004), these6
may have contributed to the species’ demise. c) Migrating slug of the slime mould7
Dictyostelium discoideum, chimeric slugs containing multiple clones migrate poorly8
compared to pure clones, suggesting that conflict inhibits their dispersal (Foster et al., 2002).9
All photos by KRF.10
Figure 2. Extinction driven by the synergistic effects of individual-level selection for11
selfishness and competitive exclusion on population density. (a) There is no extinction12
without individual-level selection for selfishness (z1 = 0). Zero-growth isoclines are shown for13
the two competing species (solid line is species 1). Long arrows on the graph show the14
trajectory of population growth. Open circles represent equilibrium population densities for15
the focal species (species 1): I is population density without species 2, II is with species 2.16
Closed circles represent the equilibrium density of species 2 without species 1. (b), When17
species 1 is allowed to evolve towards its ESS level of selfishness, it is driven extinct before it18
can reach it. The grey line in (b) represents the isocline of species 1 in the absence of any19
selfishness (z1=0).  This example assumes an incentive for selfishness (? = 0.1, c = 1, ?=1),20
which in the single species case results in an an ESS for species 1 at z1 = 0.0909.21
22
Figure 3. Individual-level selection for selfishness and ecological competition without23
extinction. Zero-growth isoclines of two competing species when the incentive to invest in24
31
competition is low (? = 0.05, c = 1, ?=1). The grey line represents the zero-growth isocline of1
species 1 when there is no selfishness (z1 = 0), the solid line represents the zero growth2
isocline of species 1 when the population is allowed to evolve towards an ESS and the dashed3
line represents the zero-growth isocline of species 2. Closed circles indicate the equilibrium4
density of species 2 in the absence of species 1. Open circles represent different equilibria of5
species 1, indicated by roman numerals. I corresponds to the equilibrium density under6
interspecific competition, when there is no selfishness (z1 = 0). II corresponds to the7
equilibrium density when species 1 is in isolation, with no selfishness. III represents the8
equilibrium density once z has evolved to an ESS. IV corresponds to the ESS of z when9
species 1 does not face interspecific competition.10
Figure 4. The effects of species-level selection on the degree of wasteful competition within a11
species in the simulation. Solid lines represent the original (exponential) distribution, dotted-12
dashed lines represent the distribution of properties of surviving species in the isolated-13
species model, and dashed lines represent the distribution of properties of surviving species in14
the community model. Medians are given for the distributions of the respective species15
properties for the original distribution from which the properties are drawn, the results of the16
isolated-species model and the results of the community model, respectively. Note that the17
tails of the distributions have not been included in the graphs. Other parameters: g = 0.02, di =18
0.001, pS = 0.05, ? = 0.05.19
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